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INERATIOAL

SETO

WOMEN REFUGEES; DOES THE UNITED STATES
PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION?
By Karen Musalo
The issue of women's rights as human rights, long neglected by
the international human rights community, has been brought
into the foreground by a series of world events. The tragic and
highly publicised use of rape and forcible impregnation by the
Bosnian Serbs as a war strategy in the former Yugoslavia
dramatically focused world attention on the violations of
women's human rights. The successful organising and
advocacy of women at two world conferences, the Fourth
World Conference on Women, which took place in Beijing in
1995, and the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna
in 1993, also focused sustained attention on the issue. At the
Vienna Conference, governments formally recognised that the
"human rights of women and of the girl-child are an inalienable,
integral and indivisible part of universal human rights." 1
Until these very recent developments, women's human rights
were largely considered outside the area of concern of the
international human rights community. The historic exclusion
of women's human rights from the mainstream human rights
movement resulted from perceptions that violations of
women's rights implicated private rather than governmental
action, and had to do with culture and tradition, which put them
off-limits to criticism from the international community. These
perceptions have been challenged by women from diverse
cultures and countries. They have forcefully made the point that
culture cannot excuse practices which violate fundamental
rights. They have also challenged the public/private distinction,
pointing to the countless situations in which governments are
complicit in human rights violations committed by private
actors by failing to provide even minimal state protection.
The perceptions that have been responsible for the slow
recognition of women's human rights as a legitimate human
rights issue have implications for the protection of women
refugees. The situations of persecution from which women flee
have often been characterised as personal, rather than political,
and therefore not a basis for refugee status. Women who fear
rape during conditions of armed conflict, or who flee to avoid
forcible sterilisation or abortion, or domestics violence have
been considered outside the sphere of protection of the
international refugee framework. The same exclusion from
protection has been the norm regarding women who resist the
practice of female genital mutilation ("FGM," which is also
referred to as female circumcision), a physically and
psychologically damaging practice which maims women for
life. Only recently have perceptions regarding women refugees
who flee such human rights violations begun to change, in
tandem with changing concepts regarding women's human
rights in general.
Canada was the first country to directly address the issue of
refugee women in an attempt to make its adjudicatory process
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more responsive. In 1993 the Canadian Immigration and
Refugee Board issued "Guidelines on Women Refugee
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution." The
Guidelines counselled that when deciding the claims of women
applicants, the decision-makers should take international
human rights standards regarding women into consideration.
As discussed in more detail below, refugee must establish that
the harm they fear is related to their race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
The Guidelines recommended a protection-oriented approach
in determining the connection between the feared harm, and the
five enumerated grounds. The Guidelines also advised
adjudicators to be more sensitive to the gender specific harms
which women may suffer, i.e., rape or sexual violence, and to
be aware of the difficulty associated with revealing such facts
in the context of an asylum application.
In 1995 the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) issued "Considerations for Asylum Officers
Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women." The
Considerations provide guidance for the INS' first tier of
asylum adjudicators 2 and is modelled somewhat on the
Canadian guidelines. Although it is a step in the right direction,
it has failed to effectively address two key aspects of U.S.
asylum jurisprudence which have resulted in failed protection
for women asylum applicants. These aspects are the unfortunate
trend in the U.S. to ignore international human rights norms in
the adjudication of refugee cases, and the misplaced reliance on
requiring proof of the persecutor's intent in determining
whether the harm is related to the race, religion, nationality,
political opinion, or social group membership of the victim.
The International Refugee Protection Framework and U.S.
Interpretation
The United States adopted the international definition of
refugee when it ratified the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees.3 In the wake of World War II, the international
community drafted the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees 4 to address the post-war European refugee crisis.
The 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
incorporated the Convention's provisions, but removed
geographical and date restrictions which limited the
Convention's applicability to the post-war European situation.
The Convention and Protocol form the cornerstone of the
international refugee protection regime.
The Convention defines a refugee as an individual who has been
persecuted in the past or has a well-founded fear of persecution
in the future "for reasons of' race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group. The
Convention encourages State signatories to provide protection
to refugees, although such protection is within the discretion of
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the State. In addition, the Convention provides for the right of
non-refoulement for the individual who faces a threat to life or
freedom "for reasons of' the same five enumerated grounds.
State signatories are prohibited from deporting individuals who
meet the requirement for non-refoulement.
Thus, pursuant to the Convention, to obtain recognition as a
refugee, or the protection of non-refoulement, an individual
must establish a type of harm (persecution for recognition as
refugee; a threat to life or freedom for non-refoulement) and a
nexus between the harm and his or her race, religion,
nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular
social group. There is an additional requirement that the
individual establish a certain degree of likelihood of the
threatened harm occurring. A full discussion of this likelihood
requirement is not necessary for the purposes of the present
discussion.
Although the U.S. incorporated the language of the Refugee
Convention into its domestic Refugee Act, it has interpreted and
applied its provisions in an increasingly formalistic and
anti-humanitarian manner. For the most part, the U.S. has
rejected international human rights norms as a relevant factor
to consider in deciding refugee claims, and it has adopted an
unreasonable evidentiary standard for proving the nexus
between the threatened harm and the enumerated grounds. In
order to prove the nexus, the applicant must prove the
persecutor's intent or motivation. The decision of a federal
court of appeals in Campos-Guardado v Immigration &
Nationality Service5 is illustrative of the failure of protection
caused by the proof of intent requirement, and provides a
particularly graphic example of denied relief to a woman who
suffered tremendous trauma, including rape and sexual
violence.
The applicant in Campos-Guardadowas brutalised during a
visit to her uncle, who was the chairman of a local agricultural
co-operative in El Salvador, during the civil war. During her
visit, several individuals arrived at the house shouting political
slogans. These individuals forced Ms Campos-Guardado and
her female cousins to watch as they brutally killed her uncle and
male cousins. The assailants then raped Ms Campos-Guardado
and her female cousins. Subsequently, Ms Campos-Guardado
encountered one of her assailants who threatened to kill her if
she revealed his identity. She suffered a nervous breakdown,
and made the decision to flee El Salvador and seek protection
in the United States.
The federal court of appeals denied relief to
Ms Campos-Guardado. The court's decision does not discuss
whether rape is the type of harm which constitutes persecution.
It wouldn't have mattered in any event, because whether the
court considered rape to be persecution or not, the court ruled
that Ms Campos-Guardado had failed to establish its nexus to
one of the five enumerated grounds. Ms Campos-Guardado had
argued that the brutal killings and rape were politically
motivated, given the slogans the individuals were shouting, and
the position of her uncle in an agricultural co-operative , which
was political in the context of the civil war. Notwithstanding
her arguments, the court ruled that Ms Campos-Guardado had
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failed to prove that the intent of the individual who raped her
was to punish her for her actual or attributed political opinions.
Given the all-too-common attitude that rape is personal rather
than political, it seems that nothing short of a clear statement of
political animus from her persecutor would have satisfied the
courts.

The U.S. requirement of proof of intent to establish nexus has
been criticised by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which has expressed
concern that it has resulted in the denial of relief to persons
suffering "serious human rights abuses."
The problem of failed protections occasioned by the
requirement of proof of intent is exacerbated by the increasing
divergence of U.S. asylum jurisprudence from international
human rights standards. In Matterof Chang6 , a precedent case,
the Board of Immigration Appeals explicitly rejected the
relevance of international human rights norms in the
adjudication of refugee claims. Matter of Chang involved a
claim to asylum based on resistance to China's enforcement of
its one-couple one-child policy through involuntary
sterilisation of both men and women. The Chang decision noted
that it was irrelevant whether "involuntary sterilisation was
demonstrated to be a violation of internationally recognised
human rights" because the applicant failed to show that the
Chinese government had a persecutory intent. According to the
Board of Immigration Appeals, the government's intent was
simply to effectuate its population control measures, and the
fact that it did so by violating internationally protected rights
was irrelevant to the determination of asylum eligibility. The
implication of such a ruling for a myriad of cases involving the
violation of other internationally recognised women's human
rights is all too apparent.
The U.S. Considerations on Women's Asylum Claims Fail
to Remedy the Failure of Protection
As discussed above, the strict evidentiary requirement for
establishing nexus, and the rejection of international human
rights norms have been significant factors in failed protection
for women refugees. Although the INS should be given credit
for issuing its Considerations on Women's Asylum Claims, it
must be recognised that they do not effectively remedy the
failure of protection. First, they fail to adequately address the
issues of nexus and the relevancy of human rights standards.
Second, the Considerations are non-binding, and are directed
only to Asylum Officers, who make up the first tier of
decision-makers. The Considerations would have had greatly
increased impact had they been issued as regulations binding
on all tiers of decision-makers.
Campos-Guardadoand Matter of Chang were both decided
prior to the issuance of the Considerations. This author has had
access to the opinions in four cases decided by three
immigration judges7 (one judge decided two cases) since the
Considerations. The decisions of only one of the three judges,
Immigration Judge Paul Nejelski, demonstrate an enlightened
approach; the decisions of the other two are all too consistent
with the approach in Campos-Guardadoand Matter of Chang.
INTER ALIA SPRING 1996
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Judge Nejelski granted relief to a Jordanian woman fleeing
thirty years of domestic battering, and to a Sierra Leonean
woman who had been the victim of female genital mutilation,
as well as domestic violence. In both cases he avoided a
formalistic application of the nexus requirement, easily finding
that both women could premise their claims on social group
membership. The Jordanian woman was a member of the social
group of women who challenge the traditions of their society,
while the Sierra Leonean woman was in the social group of
women who attempt to assert their autonomy. In both cases he
had no difficulty finding that the respective governments had
failed to provide protection to the women applicants.
The approach taken by Judge Nejelski was not adopted by his
brethren, Immigration Judges Gossart and Ferlise. Immigration
Judge Gossart denied relief to a woman applicant from Sierra
Leone. Similar to the woman in Judge Nejelski's case, she had
suffered female genital mutilation, and wanted to protect her
daughters from it. Judge Gossart ruled that her opposition to
female genital mutilation could not be a successful basis for her
claim, because the applicant could simply change her mind and
acquiesce to it. The judge made such a ruling notwithstanding
the fact that the INS' own documentation centre issued a report
listing the following as adverse health consequences related to
FSM: "scarring, infertility, painful sexual intercourse, long and
obstructed labour, chronic uterine and vaginal infections, HIV
infection from contaminated instruments, bladder incontinence
and the obstruction of the flow of menstrual blood. ''8 He also
ignored the fact that the practice has been broadly condemned
by the international community. 9
Immigration Judge Ferlise denied relief to a young Togolese
woman who fled to escape the imminent infliction of FGM, as
well as a forced polygamous marriage, into which she had been
sold. 10 The young woman had been raised by an enlightened
father, who had protected her and her four sisters from being
mutilated, and from being forced into marriages not of their
choosing. When the applicant's father died, his family took
guardianship of the seventeen year old applicant, sold her into
a marriage with a man more than twice her age, and made
arrangements for her to be mutilated. With the help of her
mother and sister, she escaped after the marriage ceremony, but
before the infliction of FSM. Judge Ferlise denied relief, ruling
that since FGM was the norm in her society, there could be no
persecutory intent. Although the INS Considerations could
have been helpful in this case, Judge Ferlise explicitly rejected
their guidance, stating that since they do not apply to
immigrationjudges, he need not consider them. Ms Kasinga has
spent more than a year in INS detention while her case is on
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The decision of
the Board will be a significant indication of how serious the
U.S. is about protecting the rights of women refugees.
Conclusion
The world is finally waking up to the fact that women suffer
violations specific to their gender, and for reasons related to
their gender, but nonetheless these abuses are human rights
violations. They are not a matter of only private concern
because they take place w ith the tacit approval of governments
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which are unable or unwilling to provide protection. This
recognition must inform refugee adjudication. Canada has been
a leader in this respect, being the first nation to develop
protection-oriented gender Guidelines. The United States has
taken a small step, with the issuance of its Considerations, but
this step has not taken it far enough. As the decisions by Judges
Gossart and Ferlise demonstrate, women who suffer severe
human rights violations are still considered to be outside the
sphere of protection. The United States must remedy its
approach, and integrate human rights considerations into its
refugee adjudication process. It must avoid an overly
formalistic approach which so often results in failed protection
for women refugees.
Karen Musalo is Visiting Professorand Acting Directorof the
International Human Rights Law Clinic at American
University, Washington College of the Law. She is an expert in
refugee and human rights law, writing and lecturing widely on
these topics and also successfully litigated two landmark
refugee cases in the United States.

NOTES
1. Vienna Declaration & Programme of Action, Part I, para.
2. In the US there are four tiers of adjudicators: asylum officers,
immigration judges, the Board of Immigration Appeals, and the federal
courts.
3. 606 U.N.T.S 267
4. 189 U.N.T.S 150
5. 809 F. 2d 285 (5th Cir. 1987)
6. Int. Dec. 3107 (BIA, May 1989)
7. The decisions of immigration judges are unpublished, therefore,
there are no formal citations to these decisions.
8. INS Resource Information Alert Report.
9. The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence Against Women, which explicitly states that
"female genital mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to
women" are forms of violence against women. In addition, the
International Federation of Gynaecology and Obstetrics, as well as the
American Medical Association, have called for its abolition.
10. The author is attorney of record for the applicant in this case.

